Quantum Resilience Starts Before Quantum Computers Arrive

An attacker doesn't need a quantum computer today to put your organisation's future confidentiality at risk. They may only need to intercept encrypted communications, store them and wait.

This is the threat behind harvest now, decrypt later: attackers collect encrypted information today in the hope that future advances in quantum computing will allow them to decrypt it.

For governments, defence organisations, financial institutions and critical infrastructure operators, the concern is particularly serious when sensitive information must remain confidential for years or decades.

Diplomatic communications, intelligence reports, infrastructure plans and citizens' records do not necessarily lose their value after a few months. Some information may need protection for an entire generation.

The question is no longer just whether your data is encrypted today. It's whether that protection will last as long as the data needs it.

At the International Cybersecurity Conference (ICSC) 2026 in Abuja, RealTyme is bringing this challenge into focus through an interactive workshop: Quantum Resilience for Mission-Critical Infrastructure: Migration Strategies for Secure and Sovereign Data.

The goal is practical: help organisations understand their cryptographic exposure, identify priorities and begin planning a transition to post-quantum security without disrupting essential services.

What Is Harvest Now, Decrypt Later, and Why Does It Matter?

Harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) is a strategy in which attackers capture and store encrypted communications with the intention of decrypting them in the future.

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Today's widely deployed public-key cryptographic systems, including RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), could become vulnerable to sufficiently powerful quantum computers.

These algorithms play important roles in establishing secure connections, authenticating identities and verifying digital signatures across modern digital infrastructure.

A future quantum computer would not automatically decrypt every stored communication. The risk depends on how the communication was protected, which cryptographic mechanisms were used and what information an attacker captured.

However, where vulnerable public-key mechanisms protect recorded communications, future advances could expose information that was considered confidential at the time of interception.

That makes data longevity a critical part of cybersecurity planning.

Consider three examples:

- Short-lived operational messages: Information that may lose its sensitivity within days or weeks.

- Government and financial records: Information that may require confidentiality for many years.

- National security and critical infrastructure plans: Information whose exposure could remain consequential for decades.

The longer information must remain confidential, the more important it becomes to assess whether today's cryptographic protections will remain adequate throughout its lifetime.

Which Cryptographic Systems Are Vulnerable to Quantum Computing?

Not all cryptography faces the same quantum risk.

A sufficiently capable quantum computer could undermine widely used public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC. These support functions including key establishment, digital signatures and identity verification.

Strong symmetric cryptography, such as AES-256, is generally considered more resilient to known quantum attacks.

This distinction matters because post-quantum migration does not mean replacing every encryption mechanism overnight.

It means understanding which cryptographic functions are vulnerable, where they are deployed and how they can be upgraded safely.

In August 2024, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalised its first three post-quantum cryptography standards:

- FIPS 203 — ML-KEM: A quantum-resistant key-encapsulation mechanism for establishing shared secrets.

- FIPS 204 — ML-DSA: A post-quantum digital signature standard.

- FIPS 205 — SLH-DSA: An additional post-quantum digital signature standard based on hash functions.

These standards provide an important foundation for organisations planning the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography.

But selecting new algorithms is only one part of the challenge. Organisations must also understand their existing dependencies, interoperability requirements and operational constraints.

Why Post-Quantum Migration Must Begin With a Cryptographic Inventory

Before an organisation can replace vulnerable cryptography, it needs to know where that cryptography exists.

RSA and ECC may be embedded across systems that were deployed at different times, managed by different teams and supplied by different vendors.

Examples include:

- VPNs and secure network connections

- APIs and application integrations

- Identity and authentication infrastructure

- Digital certificates and signatures

- Hardware security modules (HSMs)

- Secure communications platforms

- Legacy applications and critical data repositories

A cryptographic inventory helps organisations identify these dependencies and determine which systems require attention first.

The next step is prioritisation.

A system protecting highly sensitive information for 25 years may require a different migration timeline from one handling information that becomes obsolete within days.

Organisations therefore need to consider the sensitivity of their data, its required confidentiality lifetime, the exposure of the systems involved and the operational consequences of making changes.

Without this visibility, post-quantum migration risks becoming a collection of isolated technology upgrades rather than a coordinated security strategy.

How Can Critical Infrastructure Migrate Without Disrupting Operations?

For critical infrastructure operators, availability is not optional.

Telecommunications networks, financial systems, energy infrastructure and government services cannot simply be taken offline while cryptographic mechanisms are replaced.

This is where hybrid cryptography and crypto-agility become important.

Hybrid cryptography combines established cryptographic mechanisms with post-quantum approaches, helping organisations introduce quantum-resistant protection as part of a phased transition.

Crypto-agility refers to the ability to update or replace cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms as standards, threats and operational requirements evolve.

But successful implementation also requires testing. New cryptographic mechanisms may introduce changes in key sizes, processing requirements, network performance and interoperability.

For mission-critical infrastructure, the objective is not simply to deploy stronger cryptography.

It is to strengthen security while keeping essential systems operational.

Think of it as reinforcing a bridge while traffic continues to flow.

Inside RealTyme's ICSC Workshop: From Awareness to Action

Understanding quantum risk is important. Knowing what to do next is where many organisations face their greatest challenge.

On 28 October 2026, RealTyme will lead a 90-minute interactive workshop at ICSC in Abuja, focused on turning post-quantum risk awareness into practical migration planning.

The session addresses four connected areas:

1. Understanding Quantum Risk

Participants examine what quantum computing could change, which cryptographic systems are vulnerable and why the confidentiality lifetime of information matters.

2. Identifying Cryptographic Exposure

The workshop explores how organisations can locate vulnerable cryptographic dependencies, assess sensitive data flows and prioritise systems for migration.

3. Planning a Phased Transition

Participants consider how hybrid cryptography, crypto-agility and emerging post-quantum standards can support migration without unnecessary operational disruption.

4. Coordinating Security and Operational Decisions

The discussion connects technical security requirements with the responsibilities of leadership, infrastructure teams, procurement, regulators and operational decision-makers.

Because post-quantum migration is not simply a cryptography project.

It is an organisational transformation that requires coordinated decisions across multiple functions.

The War Room: 24 Months of Intercepted Data. 90 Days to Respond

What happens when a government agency discovers that its encrypted communications have been intercepted for two years, and it has just 90 days to strengthen its defences?

This is the challenge at the heart of RealTyme's interactive War Room exercise.

Participants will step into a simulated national security scenario where they must balance emerging cryptographic risks, operational continuity, limited resources and competing institutional priorities.

Working across different roles, they'll face difficult decisions about what to protect first, how to respond under pressure and how to build a realistic path towards post-quantum readiness.

The exercise moves beyond theory, challenging participants to think about both immediate priorities and long-term migration strategies.

Because quantum resilience isn't just about choosing stronger cryptography. It's about making the right decisions before the threat becomes a reality.

Quantum Resilience Workshop at ICSC 2026

Workshop: Quantum Resilience for Mission-Critical Infrastructure: Migration Strategies for Secure and Sovereign Data

Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2026

Time: 14:50–16:20 WAT

Location: Room A, Abuja Continental Hotel, Nigeria

Facilitators: Dr. Onur Özen, CEO, and François Rodriguez, CCO, RealTyme.

The session is designed for government and national security leaders, CISOs, cybersecurity professionals, infrastructure architects and teams responsible for sensitive communications and critical digital services.

Participants will gain a structured approach to identifying quantum-vulnerable cryptography, understanding migration trade-offs and developing a phased roadmap for post-quantum readiness.

Beyond ICSC: Turning Quantum Awareness Into Long-Term Readiness

The discussions at ICSC highlight a challenge that extends beyond any single conference: preparing for quantum threats requires a coordinated, long-term approach.

For organisations responsible for mission-critical infrastructure, meaningful progress begins with understanding where vulnerable cryptography exists, how long sensitive information must remain protected and which systems should be prioritised.

A practical starting point includes three areas:

- Cryptographic visibility: Identifying RSA, ECC and other cryptographic dependencies across critical systems.

- Data confidentiality: Assessing which information requires protection for years or decades.

- Migration planning: Establishing immediate priorities and a phased roadmap that accounts for operational continuity.

These steps help organisations move from general awareness to a structured approach to post-quantum readiness.

Building on the ICSC session, RealTyme also offers dedicated, full-day Quantum Resilience workshops for government agencies and organisations managing mission-critical infrastructure. These sessions provide an opportunity for teams to explore cryptographic risks, migration priorities and practical planning considerations in the context of their own operational environments.

Quantum Resilience Begins With Today's Decisions

Preparing for the quantum era is not about predicting exactly when cryptographically relevant quantum computers will arrive.

It is about understanding today's cryptographic dependencies, protecting information that must remain confidential for years and building the flexibility to adapt as technologies and standards evolve.

The transition will take time, coordination and careful planning. But organisations do not need to wait for quantum computers to become a practical threat before taking the first steps.

Quantum resilience starts with the decisions organisations make today, long before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer arrives.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is post-quantum cryptography migration?

Post-quantum cryptography migration is the process of identifying cryptographic systems vulnerable to future quantum attacks and transitioning them to quantum-resistant alternatives.

Why should organisations prepare for quantum threats now?

Encrypted information intercepted today could become vulnerable to future decryption, particularly when it must remain confidential for many years.

Where should organisations begin their post-quantum migration?

Organisations should begin with a cryptographic inventory, identify sensitive data and prioritise systems based on risk, confidentiality requirements and operational importance.